Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar'45)
Officially released from restricted status by the U.S. Army Center For Military History.
1. TOWN AND STREET FIGHTING
In attacking a town or village, the Germans employ flanking
and encircling tactics. They attempt to cut off water, electricity,
gas, and other utilities. While carrying out the flanking maneuver,
they pin down the defenders with heavy artillery fire and
aerial bombardment. When it is necessary to make a direct
assault, the Germans concentrate all available heavy weapons,
including artillery and air units, on one target. They favor
as targets for their massed fire the forward edges of the
community, especially detached groups of buildings and
isolated houses. During the fire concentration the infantry
assembles and attacks the objective immediately upon
termination of artillery fire. Tanks and assault guns
accompany the infantry in sweeping away barricades, blasting
passages through walls, and crushing wire obstacles. Guns and
mortars are used against concealed positions, and antitank
guns cover side streets against possible flanking operations.
Machine guns engage snipers on roofs.
The immediate objective of the Germans is to divide the area
occupied by the enemy. These areas are then isolated into as many
smaller areas as possible, in order to deny the enemy freedom
of movement.
Another form of attack employed by the Germans is to drive
through a community and establish good positions beyond the
town to block the retreat of the defender. Then they try
to annihilate the enemy within the community.
The assaulting troops are divided into a number of columns
and make a series of coordinated parallel attacks. Attacks
from opposite directions and conflicting angles are avoided,
since they lead to confusion and to firing on friendly troops.
The columns are sub-divided into assault and mop-up groups.
Assault detachments of engineers, equipped with demolition
equipment, flame throwers, and grenades, accompany the
infantry. Where possible, the Germans blast holes through
the walls of rows of buildings along the route of advance
in order to provide the infantry with covered approaches. These
passages afford protection for bringing up supplies and
evacuating casualties. Houses are cleared of defenders by
small-arms fire. Streets are avoided as much as possible
by the Germans who infiltrate simultaneously through
back yards and over roofs. They attempt to further the
advance by seizing high buildings which offer dominating
positions and wide fields of fire.
When compelled to advance through streets, the Germans
move in two files, one on each side of the thoroughfare.
The left side is preferred as it is more advantageous
for firing right handed from doorways. Consideration is
given to the problem of fighting against defenders
organized not only in depth but in height. Consequently
the men receive specific assignments to watch the rooms,
the various floors of buildings, and cellar windows.
Side streets are immediately blocked, and at night
searchlights are kept ready to illuminate roofs.
As soon as a building is occupied, the Germans organize
it into a strongpoint. Windows and other openings are
converted into loopholes and embrasures. Cellars and attics
are occupied first in organizing for defense.
Even buildings which have been completely destroyed are
kept under constant observation to prevent their
reoccupation by the enemy. From occupied buildings the Germans
deliver continuous machine-gun and rifle fire with the
object of denying the enemy the opportunity to occupy
alternate positions.
Underground corridors and sewers, which provide excellent
cover for defenders, are attacked with determination. When
immediate clearance or smoking-out is not possible, the
entrances are barricaded, blocked, or guarded.
Aware that their tanks and assault guns are vulnerable to
attacks by tank-hunting units, the Germans assign infantry
to protect them. Barricades and obstacles are cleared by
infantry and engineers. All able-bodied civilians,
regardless of danger, are summoned to clear the streets of
debris.
When a section of a town is occupied, the Germans close up all
side streets leading from the occupied area, block all exits
of houses, and then begin a house to house search with
details assigned to special tasks, such as mopping up
roofs, attics, basements, courtyards, and staircases.
2. ATTACK ON FORTIFIED POSITIONS
The Germans realize the difficulty of attacking a strongly
fortified enemy position and prepare such an attack well in
advance of the actual operation. Before attacking a large
and intricately fortified position covering a large area -
a classic example was the assault on the Belgian Fortress
Eben Emael - the Germans attempt to secure, in addition to
information obtained through normal reconnaissance, its
exact plan by the employment of agents and fifth columnists.
When time permits, they construct a duplicate of the
fortification on similar terrain well in the interior of
German, as they did with Eben Emael. In building such
installations for intensive rehearsal training of specially-
organized combat teams, the Germans spare neither labor
nor expense. These special combat teams usually consist of
combat engineers, reinforced by infantry, antitank, and chemical
warfare units.
The attack on the fortress usually is preceded by an intensive
dive-bomber bombardment and long-range heavy-artillery fire.
The purpose of these bombardments is to destroy obstacles
and minefields, and to create bomb craters which not only
provide cover for the assaulting troops but also may be
converted into firing positions. Often paratroopers land in
close proximity to the fortification just prior to the
assault, immediately establishing radio communications with the
combat-team headquarters.
The climatic phase of the operation is the assault. Its primary
objective is to get the engineers forward to certain selected
works. during the approach, and until the engineers reach the
fortifications, the artillery delivers fire of maximum intensity.
Antitank guns lay direct fire against the embrasures, and
chemical warfare units employ smoke to blind forts and
adjacent supporting works. The infantry covers the embrasures
with rifle and machine-gun fire and remains in readiness to
move forward and consolidate any success the engineers may gain.
Engineers crawl forward, utilizing shell holes for cover.
They are equipped with hand grenades, blocks of TNT, and
submachine guns. Some groups use bangalore torpedoes, some
pole charges, while still others are armed with heavy flame
throwers. With TNT and pole charges, they attempt to demolish
systematically the weaker works such as embrasures, ports,
turrets, joints, and doors.
3. COMBAT IN WOODS
When attacking into woods, the Germans usually divide the
area into company sectors. The Germans stress constant
reconnaissance to discover the most weakly manned enemy position.
This reconnaissance is carried out, even though company
strength becomes temporarily reduced. Reconnaissance patrols
usually move clockwise from their original position. The company
commander reviews the reconnaissance reports in detail with
his platoon and section leaders.
The company usually deploys in wedge formation when advancing.
In order to achieve surprise, the Germans often leave the roads
and advance cross-country.
As soon as the point of the wedge of the company is in sight
of the enemy, the Germans creep forward to close-combat range,
always keeping contact with adjacent and supporting units. The
company then storms the enemy's position, using the greatest
possible number of hand grenades, pole charges, and close-
combat weapons. The advance elements attempt to break into
the hostile position as deeply as possible, the body of
the wedge widening the penetration on both sides. The company
commander then decides whether to roll up the enemy position
on the more important flank or to hold the ground until
reinforcements arrive before continuing the attack.
Each platoon details at least one observer, armed with an
automatic weapon to neutralize enemy treetop snipers. The
Germans believe that bursts of fire, rather than single shots,
are necessary to deal effectively with such snipers.
The Germans consider fighting in wooded areas as the primary
task of riflemen and machine gunners, since the employment
of heavy-support weapons often is impossible. The Germans
occasionally dismount heavy machine guns and use them as
light caliber machine guns. Antitank guns of small caliber
and light infantry howitzers sometimes are brought forward
manually, and when indirect fire is not possible they
engage targets directly. Light mortars are employed
individually. From Finnish troops, the Germans learned a
successful method of using mortars in woods. The mortar
observers, accompanied by a telephone operator, move with the
advance element. The line back to the mortar crew is
exactly 200 yards long. One man is detailed to see that the
line does not get hung on the way and as far as possible
runs in a straight line. When the advance element contacts
the enemy, the observer judges the distance from himself
to the target and adds the 200 yards to the mortar range.
Bracketing of fire for adjustment is considered too dangerous
because of the close proximity of friend and foe.
When the Germans leave a woods or have to cross a large
clearing within the wooded area, the troops work themselves
close to the edge of the woods. Then all the men leave the
woods simultaneously, rushing at least 100 yards before
seeking cover.
4. COMBAT IN MOUNTAINS
a. GENERAL
The German principles of combat in mountain areas correspond
in general to those employed on level terrain. The peculiarities
of mountain terrain, such as limited routes, extreme weather
conditions, and difficult communications, necessitate
additional considerations in the tactics employed. The
greatest differences occur in the higher mountains, where the
Germans utilize specially trained mountain troops, which
include the renowned Tyrolean and Bavarian mountaineers.
The Germans emphasize that all operations will be of
longer duration in mountainous country than in lowlands, and
therefore make proper allowance for the factors of time
and space. For every 330 yards of ascent or 550 yards of
descent they add 1 hour to the time estimate for
covering a given distance on the map. Movements, command,
and supply in mountain areas represent sources of difficulty,
according to the Germans.
b. TACTICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MOUNTAIN WARFARE
The Germans divide their units into numerous marching
groups, which normally consist of a reinforced infantry
company, an artillery battery, and an engineer platoon.
In this manner the Germans counteract the danger of ambush,
since each group is able to fight independently. The Germans
locate their engineer units well forward with the advance guard
so that they may assist in road repairs. The Germans realize
that small enemy forces can retard the advance of a whole
column and therefore they have single guns sited well
forward. They also organize stationary and mobile patrols
for flank protection.
The skill and leadership of junior commanders are severely
tested in mountain warfare, as forces generally are split into
small groups, the efficient command of which requires a
high standard of training and discipline. Columns often are
separated by large areas and impassable country, and since
lateral communication is often very difficult, command of
deployed units becomes much more complicated than over
level terrain.
Normally supplies are organized in two echelons, the mountain
and valley echelon.
The Germans make extensive use of high-trajectory weapons
in mountain fighting, although antitank guns and heavy machine
guns are used for covering road blocks. The effectiveness of the
mountain artillery depends on carefully selected observation
posts which are in communication with the single gun positions.
Radio is the primary means of communication, since the laying
of telephone wire is not considered feasible.
c. MOUNTAIN TACTICS
Attacks across mountains are made to protect the flanks of
the main attack, to work around the enemy rear, or to provide
flanking fire for the main attack. The Germans attempt to seize
commanding heights and mountain passes.
The Germans select their assembly areas as close to the enemy as
possible to make possible a short assault. Supporting weapons are
attached to companies, and where feasible, to platoons.
In defense, the Germans organize their advance positions on
the forward slope, while the main battle position with heavy-
support weapons is located on the reverse slope. The greater
part of a unit often is held in reserve. This necessitates
the organization of relatively narrow sectors, which, however,
results in an organization of ground favorable for counterattacks.
4. WINTER WARFARE
Many of the techniques of German winter warfare were developed
from those of the mountain troops, which were adapted easily
to conditions of extreme cold.
Ski patrols are the chief means of reconnaissance in snow-covered
terrain. As a rule, the strength of the patrol is a squad,
reinforced by infantry soldiers trained as engineers, artillery
observers, and a communication detachment. In addition to normal
reconnaissance missions, patrols obtain information as to the
depth of the snow, load capacity of ice surfaces, and danger
of avalanches. These ski patrols normally blaze trails by
marking trees or rocks and by erecting poles or flags. Stakes
are used to indicate the extremities of roads.
Under winter conditions, German units keep support weapons
and artillery well forward while on the march. Their antitank
weapons are distributed throughout the entire column. Ski troops
are organized to guard the flanks. Sleighs are added for the
support of weapons and supplies.
The Germans assign to trail units the task of cutting tracks
for the formations that follow. The strength of the trail unit
of a company is one or two squads; that of a battalion up
to two platoons. In difficult terrain their strength may be
doubled. Trail units are divided into a number of trail
detachments consisting of six to ten men, echeloned behind
the first of the trail units. The march formation of ski troops
is generally single file; usually parallel trails are used
to reduce the length of the column.
In winter warfare, attacks with limited objectives are the
rule. The Germans attempt wherever possible to combine
frontal and flank attacks under conditions of extreme cold and
snow. They employ support weapons as far forward as practicable.
Attacks often are made by ski troops; because of the difficulty
of transporting artillery, ski troops frequently have to
dispense with artillery support. For this reason the Germans
consider it all the more necessary to concentrate heavy and
light infantry weapons at points of main effort and to coordinate
high and flat trajectory weapons. When pack howitzers are available,
they can be dismantled and brought forward on sledges. Assault
guns can effectively support ski troops in snow under 16 inches deep.
They either accompany the attack as far as road conditions
allow or move into positions at effective range, not exceeding
3,500 yards, on specially cleared paths away from roads. They
occupy their positions just before the attack. As a rule
attached assault guns are employed in platoon and company
strength; single commitment is avoided. Tank units are attached
only in exceptional circumstances.
Organization of a defensive position in deep snow or on frozen
ground takes considerable time, for it is necessary to move weapons
into position, lay out foot paths and roads, and build strong
outposts and strongpoints with all-around defense. Camouflage
is particularly stressed under such conditions. Since normal
units used as reserves in deep snow have only limited mobility,
the Germans employ ski troops for reserves wherever possible.
These ski units are used for immediate counterattacks which
are directed, where possible, against the flank of the
attacking enemy. The Germans also use the ski troops as raiding
parties to harass the enemy's front and rear.
6. PARTISAN WARFARE
Note: As this file concerns itself only with German tactics
the majority of this section which deals with
Allied partisan activities has been omitted.
This includes sections "a" through "e".
f. GERMAN PREPARATION FOR PARTISAN WARFARE
Beyond doubt, the Germans prepared and are still preparing
fanatical members of the National Socialist Party, SS, and
armed forces for partisan activities as the territory occupied
by the Allies increases. One of Heinrich Himmler's main duties
as commander-in-chief of the Home Army is supervising the
establishment of partisan organizations and stay-behind agents
in areas about to be occupied by the Allies. The Germans have
built up large stores of ammunition and supplies, particularly
in the mountainous areas of the country, and have established
at various localities training centers for future German
SS Partisans. Women are included in this training program.
As to the methods which the Germans are most likely to
employ, no definite information can be revealed at this time.
However, it is recommended that a study of the Allied
partisan combat methods be made to obtain an approximate
conception of possible German partisan activities.
7. ANTI-AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
The Germans consider the use of mines and wire obstacles
particularly effective against enemy airborne operations.
They block landing fields and areas where landings might be
made with S-mines, stakes, ditches, piled earth, stone,
and wood, nondescript vehicles without wheels, and other
barricades. They also construct minefields and dummy
minefields.
For the protection of important installations against
airborne attack, the Germans organize an all-around defense,
giving particular attention to covering avenues of approach
with machine guns. Observation posts are set up on high
points, such as church towers and terrain features to give
early warning of hostile landings. Such posts are located
also in rear areas, and are especially important in thinly
populated localities, since wire communications are particular
targets of enemy airborne troops. Special signs by church
bells, drums, or bugles are arranged for alarming the
German mobile reserves units. These units, specially organized
for the task of counteracting enemy airborne invasions and
partisan activities usually consist of motorized troops with
machine guns and antitank guns mounted on their vehicles.
Although the Germans consider it an error to delay in
committing these units, they stress that care should be
used to avoid enemy deceptive maneuvers such as the dropping
of dummy parachutists.
The Germans usually withhold rifle fire until descending
parachutists are at close range, using machine-gun fire
at greater distance. They believe that fire is more effective
immediately upon the landing of the hostile force, before
a consolidation of position has been made. Enemy transport
planes are considered particularly good targets since they must
reduce speed just prior to the jump of the troops.
The Germans appreciate the importance of immediate action
against airborne troops and when no alternative is possible
they will commit inferior forces to combat the hostile
aerial invasion, hoping to delay the attack until reserves
can be brought up.
