Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar'45)
Officially released from restricted status by the U.S. Army Center For Military History.
1. GENERAL
The fundamental principle of German offensive doctrine is to
encircle and destroy the enemy. The objective of the combined arms
in attack is to bring the armored forces and the infantry into
decisive action against the enemy with sufficient fire power
and shock. Superiority in force and fire power, the employment
of armored forces, as well as the surprise element, play a great
part in the offensive.
Coordination between the combined arms under a strong unified
command is, the Germans emphasize, an absolute requisite to the
success of these shock tactics. This has become more and more
true as the Allies have developed effective antitank weapons
and have adopted deeper defenses, limiting the self-sufficiency
of German tanks. To counter these measures, the Germans have
increased the mobility and armor protection of their
motor-borne infantry, and have mounted a large proportion
of both their direct and indirect heavy support weapons on self-
propelled carriages.
In attempting thoroughly to paralyze the defender up to the
moment of the tank-infantry assault, the Germans realize that
even the most formidable forces are never sufficient for
overwhelming superiority on the entire front. They therefore
select a point of main effort (Schwerpunkt) for a breakthrough,
allotting narrow sectors of attack (Gefechtsstreifen) to the
troops committed at the decisive locality. There they also
mass the bulk of their heavy weapons and reserves. The other
sectors of the front are engaged by weaker, diversionary forces.
In selecting the point of main effort, the Germans consider
weaknesses in the enemy's defensive position; suitability
of the terrain, especially for tanks and for cooperation
of all arms; approach routes; and possibilities for
supporting fire, especially artillery. Although the Germans
select a point of main effort in all attacks, they usually
also make plans for shifting their main effort if they
meet unexpected success elsewhere. To allow such shifts,
sufficient reserves and a strong, unified command are
organized.
An attack along a narrow front, according to German doctrine,
must have sufficient forces at it's disposal to widen the
penetration while maintaining its impetus, and to protect the
flanks of the penetration. Once the attack is launched, it
must drive straight to its objective, regardless of opposition.
2. TYPES OF ATTACK
a. FLANK ATTACK (Flankenangriff)
The Germans consider that the most effective attack is against
the enemy's flank. The flank attack develops either from the
approach march - sometimes through a turning movement - or from
flank marches. It attempts to surprise the enemy and permit him
no time for countermeasures. Since mobility and the deception of
the enemy at other positions are required, the flank attack
is most successfully mounted from a distance; the troop
movements necessary for the maneuver can be executed in close
proximity to the enemy only with unusually favorable terrain
or at night. Attacks are launched on both flanks only when
the Germans consider their forces clearly superior.
b. ENVELOPMENT (Umfassungsangriff)
The envelopment is a combination flank-and-frontal attack
especially favored by the Germans. The envelopment may be directed
on either or both the enemy's flanks, and is accompanied by
a simultaneous frontal attack to fix the enemy's forces.
The deeper the envelopment goes into the enemy's flanks,
the greater the danger of being enveloped oneself. The Germans
therefore emphasize the necessity of strong reserves and
organization of the enveloping forces in depth. Success of
the envelopment depends on the extent to which the enemy is
able to dispose his forces in the threatened direction.
c. ENCIRCLEMENT (Einkreisung).
An encirclement, the Germans think, is a particularly
decisive form of attack, but usually more difficult to execute
than a flank attack or an envelopment. In an encirclement, the
enemy is not attacked at all in front, or is attacked in front
only by light forces, while the main attacking force passes
entirely around him, with the objective of maneuvering him
out of position. This requires extreme mobility and deception.
d. FRONTAL ATTACK (Frontalangriff).
The Germans consider the frontal attack the most difficult
of execution. It strikes the enemy at his strongest point, and
therefore requires superiority of men and materiel. A frontal
attack should be made only at a point where the infantry can
break through into favorable terrain in the depth of the
enemy position. The frontage of the attack should be wider
than the actual area (Schwerpunkt) chosen for penetration,
in order to tie down the enemy on the flanks of the
breakthrough. Adequate reserves must be held ready to
counter the employment of the enemy's reserves.
e. WING ATTACK (Flugelangriff)
An attack directed at one or both of the enemy's wings has,
the Germans teach, a better chance of success than a central
frontal attack, since only a part of the enemy's weapons
are faced, and only one flank of the attacking force or
forces is exposed to enemy fire. Bending back one wing may
give an opportunity for a flank attack, or for a single or
double envelopment.
f. PENETRATION (Einbruch) AND BREAKTHROUGH (Durchbruch)
These are not separate forms of attack, but rather the
exploitation of a successful attack on the enemy's front, wing,
or flank. The penetration destroys the continuity of the
hostile front. The broader the penetration, the deeper
can the penetration wedge be driven. Strong reserves
throw back enemy counterattacks against the flanks of
the penetration German units are trained to exploit a
penetration to the maximum so that it may develop into a
complete breakthrough before hostile countermeasures can be
launched on an effective scale. The deeper the attacker
penetrates, the more effectively can he envelop and
frustrate the attempts of the enemy to close his front again
by withdrawal to the rear. The attacking forces attempt
to reduce individual enemy positions by encircling and
isolating them. The Germans do not consider a breakthrough
successful until they overcome the enemy's artillery
positions, which usually is the special task of tanks.
Reserve units roll up the enemy's front from the
newly created flanks.
The Germans often refer to this maneuver as "Keil und Kessel".
3. ORGANIZATION OF THE ATTACK
a. ATTACK ORDER.
The attack order (Angriffsbefehl) generally contains the
objective of the attack, the disposition of the infantry, unit
sectors and boundaries, disposition and support missions of
the artillery, location of reserves, and the time of attack.
The order is not drawn up in accordance with any stereotyped form,
but as a rule follows this pattern:
(1) Estimate of the situation (disposition of hostile and friendly troops)
(2) Mission.
(3) Assembly areas for the forward companies; objective; sector
boundaries; orders for the continuation of combat
reconnaissance.
(4) Instructions for the preparation of the heavy-weapons fire
support, especially for massed fire.
(5) Orders to the artillery for fire preparation and coordination.
(6) Assembly areas for the reserves.
(7) Time of attack.
(8) Instructions for rear services (medial service and supplies).
(9) Location of command posts.
(10) Miscellaneous.
b. SECTORS OF ATTACK.
The width of a sector assigned to an infantry unit in the attack
depends on the unit's mission and battle strength, on terrain
conditions, on the available fire support of all arms, and on
the probable strength of enemy resistance. Normally the sector
assigned to a platoon is between 165 and 220 yards. A company
attack sector is about 330 to 550 yards. A battalion sector
is about 440 to 1,100 yards, while a division sector may be
4,400 yards to 5,500 yards. These sectors also provide the
boundaries for the other arms, especially for the artillery
in support of the infantry, although the artillery may
utilize favorable observation positions in neighboring sectors.
This also applies to the heavy infantry weapons.
For large units the sectors are determined from the map; for
smaller units, from the terrain. These sectors extend as deep into
enemy territory as the plan of battle may require. As the
situation develops, changes are frequently made. Important
points always lie within units' sectors, unless they are to
be attacked by several units. The Germans do not consider it
necessary to occupy the whole width of the sector with
troops. Open flanks ordinarily are not bounded.
c. FIRE PLAN.
Fire superiority is achieved through coordination of the
infantry and artillery weapons. The basis of the fire plan
(Feuerplan) is the regulation of the commitment of
all weapons. The fire plan includes the following:
(1) Assignment of combat missions.
(2) Distribution of observation sectors and fields of fire
for the infantry and the artillery.
(3) An estimate of capabilities of the artillery for
effective execution of the combat mission.
(4) Orders for the commencement of fire and fire schedules.
(5) Orders for the preparation for massed fire.
(6) Instructions for ammunition supply.
The Germans stress the coordination of flat and high trajectory
weapons so that all dead spaces are covered by fire. Lack of
signal equipment however, often hinders the application of
this principle.
4. CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK
a. GENERAL.
Most of the German successes in the present war have been
achieved with armored formations. Years of secret training and
equipping were devoted to the development of the Panzer division.
The original German blitzkrieg tactics were based on the belief
in the irresistible power of tank formations operating
independently with the support of dive- bombers. Considerable
modifications have taken place in this theory over the past
few years. At the present time, the offensive tactics of the
Germans are less spectacularly bold than they were in 1939, but
the fundamental theory behind them has changed remarkably little,
though in their armored tactics they stress more tank-infantry
coordination since unlimited air support is no longer at their
command.
The main weight of all major German attacks since 1939 was
borne by the Panzer division. Where infantry divisions have
been employed, they were limited to local attacks on a
comparatively minor scale, or to mopping up in rear of the
Panzer divisions. The Germans never envisaged a full-scale
attack by infantry formations on fixed defenses. German tactics
have been to outflank or encircle the main area of the enemy
defenses with tank formations and to have the infantry roll
up the defenses from the rear, or to break frontally through
the enemy defenses with massed tanks and develop the famous
"Keil und Kessel" maneuver.
The Germans learned at heavy cost the futility of charging
a hostile antitank defense with tank concentrations and of
engaging in tank-versus-tank combat without having
superiority in range and armament. They have learned that
large formations of tanks cannot achieve a breakthrough,
opposed by an effective screen of antitank guns, without
the assistance of other arms. Therefore attention has to be
given to the combined tactics of tanks and Panzer Grenadiers,
the mechanized or motorized infantry who accompany the tanks.
Great emphasis in German offensive theory is laid on the role
of the artillery, but in practice the artillery-support role
has devolved to an ever-increasing degree on the tanks and
assault guns. Nevertheless, the principle that the supporting
fire should be concentrated on a narrow frontage where the
tanks and infantry are most likely to achieve a breakthrough
has been retained.
The fact that part of the enemy resistance is likely to remain
undisclosed until the attack has already begun has caused the
Germans permanently to decentralize a portion of the field
artillery. This tendency has led to the emergence and continual
development of the assault guns, whose main function is the close
support of infantry and tanks in the attack. Their armor and
mobility allow them to operate much farther forward than the
field artillery.
The tendency to detach field artillery battalions from their
field artillery regiment remains strong. In fact, this tendency
is so prevalent that a concentration of massed artillery preceding
an attack seldom is achieved, necessitating, as it does, a great
degree of centralized control. The Germans however, replace the
massed artillery fire to a large extent with the fire of multi-
barreled mortars and rocket projectors, though these latter
have not the accuracy of the former.
The Germans make a clear distinction between an attack made
from movement and an attack from a prepared position, which is the
more common of the two.
b: ATTACK BY MECHANIZED AND MOTORIZED FORCES.
(1) THE ATTACK
In armored-force operations, the Germans stress the
need for the concentrated employment, at the decisive place and
time, of the entire combined command of tanks and other arms, less
necessary reserves. The tanks constitute the striking force of
such a command and normally advance as the first echelon of the
attack. Their primary mission is to break through and attack the
enemy artillery, rather than to seek out and destroy enemy tanks,
which can be more effectively engaged by antitank units. The mission
of the other arms is to assist the tanks in their advance, and
particularly to eliminated antitank weapons. The smallest combat
unit in such a force of combined arms is the commune.
The basic formation for the tank platoon, company, and battalion
are file, double file, wedge, and blunt wedge. The type of formation
used for a specific task depends to a large extent on terrain
conditions and the strength of enemy opposition. A German tank
platoon normally consists of one command tank and two tank squads
of two tanks each.
The tank regiment normally attacks in waves, in either of the
following manners:
The tank regiment is echelon in depth, one tank battalion
following the other. The regimental commander's location is between
the two battalions. This formation has the advantages of a sufficiently
wide front (about 1100 yards), and close contact by the company
commander of his units in the conduct of the attack. When two tank
battalions are attacking, one behind the other, it takes them about
half an hour to pass their own infantry.
When the two-battalions-abreast formation is employed, it is
almost essential that another tank regiment form the following
wave. This formation usually has the disadvantage of being too wide.
The regimental commander cannot observe his units, and he has no
units of his own behind him which he can commit in a decisive moment.
The attack normally proceeds in three waves.
The first wave thrusts to the enemy's antitank defense and artillery
positions.
The second wave provides covering fire for the first wave, and
then attacks the enemy's infantry positions, preceded, accompanied,
or followed by part of the Panzer Grenadiers, who dismount as close
as possible to the point where they must engage the enemy. The
objectives of the second wave are the remaining antitank positions,
positions of heavy infantry-support weapons, and machine-gun
emplacements which hold up the advance of the infantry.
The third wave, accompanied by the remainder of the Panzer Grenadiers,
mops up.
These three waves now often are telescoped into two, the first wave
speeding through the enemy's positions as far as his gun positions,
the second crushing the enemy's forward positions in detail and
mopping up the opposition no dealt with by the first wave or which has
revived since the first wave passed through.
A typical attack formation of this type might be divided up among
the Panzer division's units as follows: the first wave, on a frontage
of about 2,000 to 3,000 yards, might consist of one tank battalion,
two companies forward, supported on the flanks by elements of the
assault gun battalion. Close to the rear of the first wave usually
follow one or two Panzer Grenadier companies in armored half-tracks.
About 150 yards to the rear of the first wave moves the second
wave, formed of the second tank battalion in the same formation,
closely followed by the remainder of the armored Panzer Grenadiers,
who are in turn followed at some distance by the motorized Panzer
Grenadiers. The flanks are protected by antitank guns which normally
operate by platoons, moving by bounds. The artillery forward observer
travels in his armored vehicles with the first wave, while the
artillery commander of the supporting artillery units usually
travels with the tank commander. Assault guns normally also accompany
the second wave.
The tanks help each other forward by fire and movement, medium or
heavy tanks taking up hull-down firing positions and giving covering
fire while the faster tanks advance to the next commanding feature.
Then the latter give covering fire to the former moving forward
to their next bound.
Once the first wave has reached the rear of the enemy's forward
defenses, it pushes straight on to attack the enemy's artillery. As
soon as these positions have been neutralized, the tanks reform
beyond the artillery positions and either prepare to exploit the attack
or form an all-round defensive position on suitable ground.
The tank commander, as the leader of the strongest unit, is in most
cases in command of the combat team, and all the other participating
arms (Panzer Grenadiers, artillery, engineers, and antitank units)
are placed under him. The Germans realize that a strong and unified
command is an essential feature of any military operation. For
certain missions, however, tank units are attached to another arm,
in which case the tank commander is consulted before the final
plans for the operations are made.
(2) INFANTRY-TANK COOPERATION
When the enemy has well prepared positions with natural or
constructed tank obstacles, the German infantry attacks before
the tanks and clears the way. The objective of the infantry is
to penetrate into the enemy position and destroy enemy antitank
weapons to the limit of it's strength and the fire power of it's
own support weapons, augmented by additional support and covering
fire from the tanks and self-propelled weapons sited in their rear.
Only after the destruction of the enemy antitank defense can
the tanks be employed on the battle line to the fullest advantage.
When the tank obstacles in front of the enemy position are already
destroyed, and no additional tank obstacles are to be expected in
the depth of the enemy's main defensive position, the infantry
breaks through simultaneously with the tank unit. The infantry
attack is conducted in the same manner as it would be without the
cooperation of tanks. Heavy infantry weapons are kept in readiness
to fire at possible newly discovered antitank positions. Of
particular importance is protection of the open flanks by echeloning
the flank units and employing heavy weapons at the flanks.
In most cases, the infantry follows the tanks closely, taking
advantage of the fire power and paralyzing effects of the tanks
upon the enemy's defense. The Germans normally transport the
infantry to the line of departure on tanks or troop-carrying
vehicles in order to protect the infantry and to increase it's
speed. The infantry leaves the vehicles at the last possible
moment, and goes into action mainly with light automatic weapons.
The tanks advance by bounds from cover to cover, reconnoitering
the terrain ahead and providing protective fire for the dismounted
Panzer Grenadiers. The tanks do not slow their advance to enable
the infantry to keep continuous pace with them, but advance alone
and wait under cover until the infantry catches up with the advance.
Terrain that does not offer sufficient cover is crossed with the
greatest possible speed.
The infantry attacks in small formations also by bounds under the
fire cover of it's own heavy weapons and of the tanks, staying away
from individual tanks because they draw the strongest enemy fire.
When a tank company attacks with infantry, there are normally two
platoons on the line, one platoon back, and the fourth platoon
in reserve. The interval between tanks is usually 100-120 yards.
The tank's machine guns usually engage infantry targets at 1000
yards range and under, while the tank guns engage targets at
2,000 to 2,500 yards.
The coordination between tanks and Panzer Grenadiers moving into
combat on armored half-tracks is similar to the technique employed
in a purely armored formation, since the armored half-tracks
are not only troop-carrying vehicles but also combat vehicles.
When the terrain is favorable for tank warfare, the Panzer
Grenadiers in their armored half-tracks follow immediately with
the second wave, after the first tank wave has overrun the
opponent's position. A deep and narrow formation is employed.
After the penetration, the main mission of the Panzer Grenadiers
is to overcome the enemy positions which survived the first wave.
In attacking enemy pillboxes, the Germans use combat groups
consisting of tanks, infantry, and engineers, assisted by artillery.
The normal composition of a combat group attacking one bunker
is one platoon of tanks and one platoon of infantry reinforced by one
squad of engineers. Before the combat group is committed against
the enemy pillbox, artillery fires high explosives and smoke
shells at the neighboring pillboxes to isolate them, shells the
terrain between pillboxes, and conducts counterbattery fire. Under
the protection fof this fire, the combat group advances close to
the pillbox while other infantry units attack the enemy in the terrain
between the pillboxes.
One tank squad covers the advances of the other tank squads and
the infantry platoon by direct fire against the pillbox, particularly
against the observation and weapons' openings. The first tank squad
halts under cover whenever possible and covers the advance of the
second tank squad.
When the combat group reaches a barbed wire obstacle surrounding
the pillbox, the two tank squads have different missions. One tank
squad remains in front of the pillbox, and it's tanks are driven
into a position from which they can overlook the terrain, and watch
out for antitank guns and machine-gun emplacements, while the other
tank squad (the pillbox tank squad) rolls across the obstacle to
enable the infantry and engineers to get close to the pillbox.
The pillbox tank squad then fires on the pillbox at close range.
The infantry squad meanwhile takes the surrounding terrain and
covers the engineers who blast the entrance of the pillbox with TNT.
(3) ARTILLERY-TANK COOPERATION
Artillery support is of decisive importance for the preparation
and the successful conduct of a tank attack. A unified command
for the entire artillery controls the artillery fire as long as
the infantry and tank units are fighting on the same line. When
the tanks break through the enemy forward defense lines, the
self-propelled artillery or any other artillery battalion
designated for the support of the tank unit is placed under the
command of the tank unit commander.
The Germans believe that the artillery fire must not check the
momentum of the attack. Consequently the heaviest fire must fall
well ahead of the tanks or outside their sector.
The mission of the artillery preparation before the attack is to
destroy, or at least neutralize, the opponent's antitank defense in
the area between the line of contact and the regimental reserve line.
Continuous counterbattery fire prevents the enemy from shelling the
tank assembly area and from breaking up the preparation of the
tank attack.
The artillery has the following missions before the tank attack:
Counterbattery fire on enemy artillery located in positions which
command the ground over which the tank attack is to be made.
Concentrations on enemy tanks in assembly areas.
Harassing fire on all areas in which the antitank units are located
or suspected. Fire is heaviest on areas in which tanks cannot
operate but from which they can be engaged effectively.
Adjusting fire with high explosives on probably enemy observation
posts commanding the sector to be attacked. These observation
posts are blinded with smoke as soon as the attack begins.
Experience has taught the Germans that the flanks of a tank
attack are vulnerable. Therefore they assign to the artillery and
the rocket projector units the task of protecting flanks by
barrages using high explosives and smoke shells.
The artillery has the following missions during the tank attack:
Counterbattery fire.
Blinding enemy observation posts.
As the attack progresses, engaging successive lines of antitank
defense, especially areas to the rear and flanks of the sector
attacked.
Screening the flanks of the attack with smoke and neutralizing
the enemy's infantry and rear areas.
Delaying the movement and deployment of enemy reserves,, particularly
tanks.
The Germans stress that this wide variety of tasks must not lead
to the wholesale dispersal of effort. The main task of the artillery
is at all times the destruction of the enemy's antitank weapons, tanks,
and artillery.
Liaison between artillery and tanks during the attack is established
by the commanding officers and the artillery liaison group, which
normally moves with the first wave. Artillery forward observers,
if possible in armored observation posts, ride with the most forward
elements. A German field expedient is for the tank unit to take along
a forward observer in one of it's tanks. It often happens that
the tankman himself has to take over the observation of the
artillery. He himself can request fire and shift concentrations
when the situation requires such changes.
