Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar'45)
Officially released from restricted status by the U.S. Army Center For Military History.
4. DEFENSE OF TOWNS.
The Germans regard towns and villages as excellent strongpoints,
particularly if the buildings are of masonry. Towns also are
regarded as excellent antitank positions because of the considerable
infantry-artillery effort necessary to neutralize them.
In defending a town or village, the Germans locate their main
line of resistance well within the built-up portion; the edges
of the town, which provide easy targets for artillery fire, are
believed to be too vulnerable. The main line of resistance
is laid out irregularly in order to develop flanking fire,
and every effort is made to conceal its location until the last
possible moment. Minor strongpoints are maintained forward
of the line in order to break up attacks and provide additional
flanking fire. Cul-de-sacs are organized and attempts made
to trap attacking forces in them for destruction by counter-
attacking mobile reserves. These reserves are kept in readiness
within the town itself, but other reserve forces are
held outside the town to prevent hostile flanking maneuvers.
Both occupied and unoccupied buildings are booby-trapped in
organizing the defended positions. Entrances to buildings are blocked
and all windows are opened so as not to disclose those from which
fire is maintained. Rooms are darkened, and passages are cut in the
walls between buildings. To avoid detection, the Germans fire
from the middle of the rooms, and frequently change their
positions, while communication is maintained through cellars
and over roofs. Machine guns are sited low, usually in
basements, to provide better grazing fire. Chimneys and cornices
are used as cover for men on roofs; tiles may be removed to
provide loopholes. Searchlights are mounted to illuminate
fields of fire; in their absence vehicle headlights may be
used as substitutes. When houses collapse, the defense is
carried on from cellars, and rubble heaps of destroyed areas
are organized into strongpoints.
Tanks are considered to be ineffective within a defended town,
although the Germans have used them in static, dug-in positions
at cross-roads and squares. As a result of their experiences
on the Eastern Front, the Germans believe single tanks are
too vulnerable to Molotov cocktails, magnetic mines, and
explosive charges. When the Germans themselves use these
antitank weapons, they employ them from foxholes dug outside
the perimeter of the town. Efforts are made to destroy
enemy tanks immobilized by antitank action, either within
or outside the town in order to prevent their recovery or use as
artillery observation posts and machine-gun nests.
Antipersonnel mines are interspersed in antitank minefields
because the attacking infantry are considered the chief
menace.
Assault guns may provide direct defensive support fire if
attacking forces break through and disorganize the German
position. To secure the added protection afforded by
masonry walls, the Germans may locate assault guns or tanks
within buildings and use them against hostile armored
vehicles and infantry. Counterattacks, supported by assault guns
or tanks, will not be withheld until the situation has become
desperate; indeed surprise counterattacks may be launched at
any time.
For the defense of village strongpoints special battle
commandants (Kampfkommandanten) are appointed. The battle
commandant is usually the senior officer and the tactical
commander of all military forces, emergency units, and civil
organizations in his area. He has the disciplinary power
of a regimental commander.
In the case of fairly small villages, consolidation of the place
itself is usually deemed sufficient. For larger localities an
outer defense system is constructed in addition to the inner
defenses.
The inner defense system consists of a number of concentric
positions which are broken down into perimeter positions,
intermediate positions, and the inner ring position. The inner
defense system is divided into sectors, each forming a strongpoint
system in itself, with the strongpoints protected by all-around
antitank and infantry obstacles and connected with each other
by trenches.
The perimeter ring position is the most important part of
the inner defenses and consists of one or more continuous
trench systems, each with a deep main battle zone. The forward
edge often is beyond the outskirts of the village, unless
this creates unfavorable conditions for the antitank defense,
in which case it is within the village itself. Artillery and
heavy support weapons are employed as whole units in support
of the perimeter ring position, although single guns may be
detached for the defense of strongpoints and roads. The
nearer the fighting approaches the inner ring, the more
likely it will be that the Germans will split up the
support weapons units for close cooperation with infantry
assault groups.
The outer defense system likewise consists of a number
of concentric positions, approximately 4-6 miles apart, so
as to force the enemy artillery to displace to engage
each one. For defense of larger towns the Germans organize
the outside ring about 12 1/2 to 18 1/2 miles beyond the
outskirts whenever feasible. Beyond this outside defense
ring, about 2,200 yards forward, are the advanced positions,
with covering units still further forward on main roads
and railways.
Patrols of all types, including motorized and cyclist
patrols, give early warning of the enemy's approach and
keep him under continuous observation. Non-military
outposts, such as police sentries, party officials, and
local farmers also are used for these duties.
Sector boundaries for companies and battalions are
defined from the outside defense ring to the center of
the town or village. Usually the do not coincide with vital
main roads, which always are defended by entire companies
or battalions. Every strongpoint, defense block (combined
adjacent buildings), and sector has local reserves;
mobile reserves, consisting of combat groups comprised
of infantry, tanks, assault and self-propelled guns,
are employed for counterattacks of a larger scale.
In addition to regular military units the Germans employ
emergency units, organized from personnel of Army, Navy,
and Air Force in town defense. Besides these regularly
organized emergency units, improvised emergency units are
formed from stragglers, remnants of formations, and
units in process or reorganization. Utilization of
emergency units is only temporary. Their main tasks, of local
nature, are protection of headquarters, supply points,
airfields, etc., and garrison service in fortifications.
5. DOCTRINE OF WESTWALL SYSTEM
The Germans consider economy of force the fundamental
principle in planning zones of permanent fortifications. They
originally built the Westwall as a protective barrier along
the French frontier to permit commitment of maximum
forces offensively in the East. Thus, in 1939, they were
able to hold in the West with approximately 20 divisions,
while employing 40 to 50 divisions against Poland.
When Westwall construction ceased in 1940, German strategy
in the West was offensive, envisioning an invasion of France
by a wide envelopment, with the bulk of the German forces in
the North, where the Westwall defenses were relatively weak.
The pivot of maneuver was south of the Moselle River, where
the Westwall defenses were strongest.
The Germans never have discarded the principle that offensive
action is the best protection. When their armies were forced
back to the Westwall in 1944, they used this defensive system
as a base for offensive operations in selected areas, as in
the Saar and the Eifel. Advantage also was taken of this
protected zone for the free lateral movement of troops;
shelters were utilized for the cover and concealment of
reserve forces, weapons, and supplies.
German Westwall tactics are based on a stubborn defense of
individual fortifications, local counterattacks against
areas of penetration, and counterattack by general mobile
reserves against areas of deep penetration. German troops
are not permitted to develop a static-defense complex which
might foster the idea that a position once surrounded is lost.
Bunker garrisons are taught to continue resistance even though
surrounded, because their perseverance impedes the attackers'
advance and facilitates counterattacks. Troops are trained
in the principle that the decision is usually achieved by the
infantry in the open between bunkers. Organic heavy infantry
weapons and artillery are the backbone of German defense
in the Westwall, just as in mobile warfare. Reserves
habitually are left under cover until the time for counter-
attack arrives.
Surprise is always attempted. For example, bunkers and
heavy weapons frequently are sited on reverse slopes, not
only for concealment and protection in defilade, but also
to open fire suddenly upon the unwary attacker crossing
the crest or moving around the nose of a hill. The
attacker penetrating the Westwall defense system must be
prepared to cope with unexpected resistance flaring up
in his rear areas, surprise by accurate flanking and enfilade
fire at short and medium ranges, sudden counterattacks by
forces not known to be in the areas, and counterattacks
in increasing strength as the penetration progresses.
German doctrine prescribes that the intact portion of the
defenses must continue the battle, regardless of the
situation at the penetrated area, until the appropriate
command orders a readjustment of the line. Penetrations
normally are dealt with as follows: by mobile reserves
which seal them off frontally; by counterattack or
counteroffensive from protected flanks to threaten the
rear areas of the penetrating force; or by both, as in
the Aachen area. At any rate, the Germans will attempt to
destroy the penetration before the attacker has reorganized
and consolidated his gains. Here again the principle of
economy of force is generally followed. German troops may
be taken from strongly protected and little threatened
areas in order to concentrate on adequate counterattacking
or counteroffensive force. Hence, the attacker should have
sufficient strength to ward off strong countermeasures
and at the same time exploit the advantages gained by
a penetration.
